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For a period of roughly thirty-five years, Japan, the Republic of
Korea, and Taiwan pursued industrial policies aimed at altering the
sectoral structure of production toward sectors believed to offer greater
prospects for accelerated growth than a typical process of industrial
evolution would generate. All developing countries, excluding perhaps
Hong Kong, have employed and continue to use industrial policy, broadly
defined. Credit directed at specific sectors at below market interest rates
for long term and working capital, sectorally differentiated profit taxes,
subsidized electricity rates, research and development subsidies, con-
trol of the entry and exit of firms, and highly differentiated tariffs and
nontariff barriers are all forms of industrial policy. Several Asian coun-
tries, particularly Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, are exemplars of these
efforts. Given their performance over this period, it is tempting to con-
clude that industrial policy played a decisive role in their success.
In analyzing the impact of industrial policy, it is important to
distinguish between the initiation of industrialization and its con-
tinuance once a higher level of growth was achieved. The recovery in
Japan between 1945 and 1955 or 1960 was probably accelerated by
government efforts to restore prewar levels of capacity and productiv-
ity in sectors such as mining, cotton spinning, and steel. In some
ways this was the relatively easy part of postwar Japanese growth, as
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the knowledge base on which the prewar structure was based had not
been destroyed. Capital accumulation, the direction of foreign exchange
to acquire critical equipment and technology licenses, and investment
coordination almost surely served a positive role, though it is hard to
prove given lacunae in data for this period. Yet when one considers the
Japanese or foreign image of Japan Inc. popular in the 1980s, the issue
is not the contribution of industrial policy to the immediate postwar
recovery, but the role of government in fostering the entry of firms into
new (for Japan) sectors and whether such policies were the source of
rapid growth in living standards in the period from 1960 to 1990.
Similarly, the Korean and Taiwanese governments probably played
a significant role in the initiation of industrial development from roughly
1960 to 1970. This was by no means a trivial achievement, and there
have been many efforts to understand the government’s role in this
process. By the early 1970s, however, both Korea and Taiwan had
achieved considerable growth in per capita income based largely on
labor-intensive industries and, as in the case of Japan, there was an
effort to move into capital- and technology-intensive sectors.
A country considering the imitation of the policies that led to the
initiation of industrialization in all three countries and trying to derive
lessons from the three countries should worry about the replicability of
their experiences. A large number of conditions have to be present in-
cluding significant government competence and an overriding interest
by the government in economic success measured in growth in per
capita income rather than in enriching specific groups at the expense
of the society. Many developing countries looking to Asia for insights
are interested not in the economies’ ability to export wigs, baseball
gloves, or shirts, which were important products in the initial growth
of manufacturing, but in their later transition into more complex sec-
tors. Much of the evidence of this paper considers the success of the
three Asian countries in their endeavor to succeed in more complex
industries in the period after higher growth was initiated.
Two questions immediately arise. First, during the period of suc-
cessful growth—say, 1960 to 1990 for Japan and 1965 through the
late 1990s for Korea and Taiwan—was industrial policy the primary
source of growth, or was it a mild accelerant, improving the growth
rate slightly given the high growth of capital, education, and gains in
total factor productivity (TFP) realized through borrowing technology
from abroad? Second, are any of the problems encountered in Japan
since 1990 and in Korea since 1997 partly the legacy of one aspect or
another of industrial policy?253 Industrial Policies and Growth
An alternative view of the role of industrial policy in explaining
these Asian success stories is that they resulted largely from getting
macroeconomic policies correct: responsible government monetary and
fiscal policy, low inflation, and maintenance of the correct real exchange
rate were key to their success, as was the considerable investment in
the education system. Growth was propelled largely by physical and
human capital accumulation, and the growth rate of TFP—while not
spectacular—was high by developing country standards.
The disagreement between those who believe in the efficacy of indus-
trial policy and those who maintain that economic fundamentals were
critical is, at one level, unbridgeable, as it would require an agreement
on the counterfactual evolution of sectors and productivity in each. Nev-
ertheless, the considerable body of evidence available that attempts to
empirically assess the impact of industrial policy brackets most of the
plausible counterfactual scenarios. The neoclassical interpretation that
success was due to getting the fundamentals right may be correct, but it
must deal with the abundant evidence that Japan, Korea, and Taiwan
were indeed interventionist (World Bank, 1993; Pack and Westphal, 1986;
Wade, 1990; Komiya, Okuno, and Suzumura, 1984). The issue is whether
the documented use of industrial policies can be shown to have been a
quantitatively significant contributor to welfare. If growth rates, condi-
tional on physical and human capital accumulation and normal TFP
growth rates, would have been 9.7 but were increased to 10 percent as a
result of industrial policy, then industrial policies may have played a
positive but not overwhelming role. Did such an increase occur and at
what contemporary cost, including lost consumer surplus, future costs,
and the weakening of the financial system that had a negative effect in
the late 1990s in Korea and throughout the 1990s in Japan?
Some would argue that the above view is too partial in that it does not
consider factor accumulation rates, which were themselves positively af-
fected by industrial policy. The 35 percent national saving rates and the
passion for education reflected profit and wage opportunities that were
generated by industrial policy or the lower risk attached to a given pro-
spective rate of return. We briefly discuss this issue later in the paper.
1. THE CASE FOR INDUSTRIAL POLICY
For selective government intervention or industrial policy to be wel-
fare improving, policymakers must identify market failures that would
provide the scope for welfare-enhancing interventions; design and imple-
ment the appropriate interventions; and correct or terminate the applied254 Marcus Noland and Howard Pack
policy as changing circumstances warrant.1 Economists have identified
numerous circumstances in which market failures could provide scope
for welfare-enhancing industrial policies, including the following.
—Real external economies, such as the diffusion of knowledge, that
one set of firms obtains without incurring its own costs. One mecha-
nism by which this occurs is the movement of individuals among firms,
but knowledge spillovers may also occur from informal exchanges in
both professional and social contexts. In the case of traded goods, real
externalities improve welfare only if they allow goods to be produced at
less than the imported cost, insurance, and freight (c.i.f.) price.2
—External economies that arise as the size of a competitive industry
increases, permitting a falling long-run supply curve. Such gains in pro-
ductivity in a competitive sector in which individual firms exhibit con-
stant or increasing costs are attributable to economies of scope in the use
of specialized equipment and greater specialization of individual skills.
Accelerating the growth of the sector may generate an earlier move to-
ward lower long-run costs as a result of learning-by-doing. Where large-
scale economies exist, firms will incur lower unit costs if capacity is
established at higher levels of output. If they perceive only a domestic
market, they will construct a larger plant only if potential purchasers
also establish large plants that generate extensive demand. The market
failure is that at a given point in time, current prices may not convey the
information about prospective expansion that is relevant to attaining a
lower cost of production through larger plant size. (Scitovsky, 1954;
Chenery, 1959). This motivates the argument for coordinating planned
investment given by Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989), who formal-
ize Rosenstein-Rodan’s (1943) idea of the big push. Multiple equilibria
result from pecuniary externalities generated by imperfect competition
with large fixed costs. They argue that industrial policy that “encour-
ages industrialization in many sectors simultaneously can substantially
boost income and welfare even when investment in any one sector ap-
pears impossible” (p. 1024). Such arguments critically depend on the
1. We use the terms welfare enhancing and growth accelerating interchange-
ably in this discussion. Most of the theoretical models are explicitly static; hence
the normative results are expressed in terms of welfare enhancement, not growth
acceleration. While it is possible that industrial policies could generate a one-step
increase in welfare that would not lead to an acceleration in the secular growth
rate, we believe that focusing solely on explicitly dynamic models would be too
limiting in this context.
2. This is not, however, sufficient to justify intervention. A socially successful
intervention depends on whether the present discounted value (PDV) of future
producer surplus exceeds the PDV of the social cost of subsidies.255 Industrial Policies and Growth
nontradability of some of the inputs or difficulties in exporting the re-
sulting output (Pack and Westphal, 1986). Growth of the size of the
economy will eventually preclude the need for policies to obtain the pro-
ductivity gains from either economies of scope or scale.
—Externalities conferred on other firms in an industry by the first
entrant. These include the demonstration that the sector is physically
and economically feasible (Pack and Westphal, 1986; Rob, 1991) and
the diffusion of information on technology and marketing conditions.3
—The incomplete appropriability of the results of research and
development (R&D) and the possibility that its private risk exceeds
social risk.
—Externalities that arise from the interaction of suppliers and
buyers on product design or production methods, leading to a better or
cheaper good than is available internationally. In this case, the source
of the externality is the nontradability of some types of inputs or knowl-
edge—otherwise the improved method or product could be obtained from
international suppliers.
In all of these cases, industrial policies can directly enhance wel-
fare by improving the competitiveness of domestic industry, leading to
both higher national (and world) output. Industrial policies can also
enhance welfare or promote growth through the capture of rents or
through terms-of-trade effects associated with international trade.4 In
these cases, national industrial policies have a zero-sum element at the
global level and could thus be thought of as containing a strategic or
predatory element. Similarly, the trade endogenous growth literature
that links the cross-national pattern of international trade specialization
to differential cross-national growth rates provides numerous theoretical
3. Okuno-Fujiwara (1988) provides a formal example of this in the form of a
model of the interdependence of two industries. One industry, which produces an
intermediate product, is assumed to be oligopolistic as a result of underlying scale
economies and to engage in Cournot competition. The other industry, which pro-
duces a final product from an intermediate product, is perfectly competitive. This
situation may result in multiple equilibria, with one equilibrium Pareto-superior
to the others. Industrial policy has a positive role in the form of preplay communi-
cation to generate a superior coordinated equilibrium. For the intervention to
convey some purely national welfare enhancement, there has to be some nontraded
aspect of the externality. Otherwise, foreigners have access to the same low-cost
inputs, and the pattern of production in the downstream industry is indetermi-
nate without additional assumptions.
4. Early formalizations of arguments along these lines are contained in Spen-
cer and Brander (1983) and Itoh and Kiyono (1987). Helpman and Krugman (1989)
provides a synthesis of the subsequent literature on strategic trade policy. Kang
(2000a, 2000b) shows that the degree of intellectual property rights protection can
have a strategic effect similar to export subsidization in the earlier literature.256 Marcus Noland and Howard Pack
possibilities for growth-enhancing industrial policies at the national
level (Grossman and Helpman, 1991).5
This discussion has established the theoretical possibility for wel-
fare- or growth-enhancing industrial policies. Comprehensively mapping
the advisable policy interventions to the specific market failures or stra-
tegic opportunities identified in the literature is beyond the scope of the
paper. Nevertheless, we would like to point out a few general caveats for
the successful implementation of industrial policies. First, the appropri-
ate policy response may be very case specific. For example, in the well-
known Brander-Spencer model, the optimal intervention changes from
an export subsidy to an export tax if Bertrand rather than Cournot com-
petition is assumed.6 In the case of the international trade models, pur-
suing domestic and international goals may require multiple policy tools
if the good in question is not purely importable or exportable.
Second, with the exception of some policies that might be accom-
plished purely through informational efforts or coordination effects,
industrial policies require scarce resources. It is not sufficient, for
example, to show that in a partial equilibrium sense, a particular
production or export subsidy might be potentially growth enhancing
if the necessary resources are mobilized at the expense of even more
worthy sectors (Dixit and Grossman, 1986). This suggests a more
general informational problem: even if policymakers identify the pos-
sibility of a growth-accelerating intervention and design an appropri-
ate policy package, they still have to calibrate the appropriate magni-
tude of, say, a tax or subsidy, because after all, it is as possible to
intervene too much as too little.
Third, in the case of globally zero-sum strategic policies, policymakers
must consider the possibility of retaliation. As a general proposition, one
would expect that the possibility of retaliation would reduce the likeli-
hood of growth-accelerating industrial policies.7 A basic lesson from the
5.The normative results of these models to a large extent turn on conven-
tional differences in factor usage across industries, and they therefore do not
appear to yield robust policy inferences. Empirical work has focused on modeling
international spillovers arising from research and development activities (for ex-
ample, Coe and Helpman, 1995; Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister, 1996) rather
than on the implications of industrial policies themselves.
6. Similarly, the presence of increasing returns to scale decreases the likeli-
hood that the optimal policy is a subsidy, since a subsidy may encourage the entry
of additional firms into the market and reduce efficiency by reducing plant size or
output. See Helpman and Krugman (1989) for more such examples.
7. As demonstrated by Johnson (1953–1954), however, the possibility of retali-
ation does not eliminate the possibility that the introduction of a tariff by a large
country would necessarily be welfare reducing, even allowing for retaliation.257 Industrial Policies and Growth
strategic trade literature is that the possibility of retaliation further com-
plicates the problem of identifying optimal policies.8
Finally, in the cases discussed thus far, intervention may be effec-
tive if the government itself does not suffer from deficiencies leading to
government failure. One of the notable lacunae of the industrial policies
literature is the general absence of discussion of political economy fac-
tors, in particular the possibility of rent-seeking behavior by self-inter-
ested firms and policymakers and the concomitant degradation of policy.
One of the important aspects of Asian industrial policies was the relative
lack of corruption, perhaps reflecting the high status of civil service jobs
and their relatively high rate of remuneration.9 We touch on these condi-
tions again in the discussion of the specific cases below.
2. INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN JAPAN
The roots of contemporary industrial policies in Japan go back to the
Meiji Restoration of the mid-nineteenth century, when state-led develop-
ment was carried out under the slogans Shokusan-Kogyo (industrializa-
tion) and Fukoku-Kyohei (a wealthy nation and a strong army.) Ironi-
cally, the unequal treaties concluded between Japan and Western pow-
ers, which greatly circumscribed Japan’s ability to protect its domestic
industries through tariffs, encouraged Japanese policymakers to develop
other tools such as targeted subsidized lending through state-controlled
banks to achieve the same effect. Intellectually, the Japanese took their
cues not from Great Britain, but from Prussia (a curious precursor of
the Axis alliance of World War II), and they followed Friedrich List, the
proponent of infant industry promotion, rather than Alfred Marshall,
the father of neoclassical economics.10
Japan developed a dual economy, exporting labor-intensive products
such as tea, textiles, and apparel while at the same time developing
considerable heavy industry, much of it organized by family-dominated
8. For example, in the Brander-Spencer model with retaliation, the previ-
ously optimal export subsidy policy is welfare reducing, and the optimal policy is a
coordinated export tax by both national governments.
9. See World Bank (1993, chap. 4); Campos and Root (1996).
10. Neoclassical economics remained weak in Japan, and until quite recently
the bulk of Japanese academic economists were Marxist in orientation. This is
relevant to the extent that there was a general coincidence between the
neomercantilist orientation of many of the so-called modern economists and the
viewpoint of the Japanese Marxists, who regarded industrial policies as the mani-
festation of state monopoly capitalism—arguably a progressive development from
their perspective.258 Marcus Noland and Howard Pack
conglomerates (zaibatsu) and oriented toward military production.
Japan defeated first China (1895) (annexing Taiwan) and then Russia
(1905) (eventually annexing Korea) and established itself as a formi-
dable military power, as recognized by Great Britain in the Anglo-Japa-
nese Alliance of 1902.
State dominance of the economy, which had waned in the early twen-
tieth century as the private sector expanded, revived with the political
radicalization of the late 1920s, the Great Depression, and the onset of
World War II in the Pacific. Many of the institutional features often
considered uniquely Japanese have their origins in the wartime economy
(Okazaki, 1993; Noguchi, 1995). The devastation of World War II left
Japan’s per capita income in 1950 at less than three-fourths its prewar
level. However, the contemporaneous level of per capita income was surely
a misleading indicator of Japan’s underlying technological capacity. Ja-
pan, after all, had produced aircraft carriers and fighter airplanes in the
1930s, and as shown in table 1, the human capital embodied in Japan’s
labor force was quite high relative to per capita income.
In the aftermath of the war, the Japanese government, in coopera-
tion with U.S. occupation authorities, implemented an economic recon-
struction plan characterized by a considerable amount of direct state
resource allocation, multiple exchange rates, extensive quantitative
controls on imports, foreign exchange, inward foreign investment, and
royalties for technology licensing.11
After the withdrawal of U.S. occupation forces in 1950, Japan
continued to implement sectoral industrial policies through tax policy,
off-budget finance, direct subsidy, subsidized credit, research and de-
velopment policy, and controls on international trade, investment,
and technology importation, as well as tolerance of cartels and other
kinds of anti-competitive behavior on the part of domestic firms. Capital
channeling required repression of the financial system and discour-
agement of direct finance. In addition to these formal policy tools,
government officials also sought to exercise influence through infor-
mal administrative guidance (gyosei shido), coercing recalcitrant firms
if necessary. These efforts were largely oriented toward rebuilding
heavy industries that had been destroyed during the war, such as
steel and transportation equipment.
11. For histories of early postwar economic policies, see Shinohara (1982);
Morishima (1982); Johnson (1982); Calder (1993). The classic work on Japanese
industrial policies is Komiya, Okuno, and Suzumura (1984). Okazaki (2001) pro-
vides a highly informative description of the institutions through which postwar
Japanese industrial policies was carried out. See also Johnson (1984); Patrick (1986).259 Industrial Policies and Growth
The conventional wisdom among economists is that direct subsi-
dies played little role in fostering changes in Japan’s industrial compo-
sition. As shown in figure 1, the declining sectors of agriculture, for-
estry, fishing, and coal mining typically account for 90 percent or more
of direct on-budget subsidies in the period after 1955, and one study by
the Japanese government found that only one sector, food processing,
received direct subsidies exceeding 0.1 percent of gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) originating in that sector (Saxonhouse, 1983).
Another strand of policies pursued by the Japanese government
comprises indirect subsidies through the tax system and off-budget fi-
nance. The primary source of subsidized capital is the Fiscal Invest-
ment and Loan Program (FILP), under the control of the Ministry of
Finance Trust Bureau. The FILP is an off-budget program around half
the size of the general account budget; it has been a powerful policy
tool, giving bureaucrats a second or shadow budget with which to ad-
dress priorities not met in the general accounts budget.
Funds for the FILP come mainly from the postal savings system.
In addition to financing the activities of public corporations, the pro-
gram finances private sector investments through public financial in-
stitutions such as the Japan Development Bank, the Export-Import
Bank, and the Housing Loan Corporation. In the early postwar period,
nearly one-quarter of FILP finance went toward strengthening indus-
try, but the share dropped steadily through the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.
By 1980, less than 3 percent of FILP funds went to industry, while
housing, regional development, and other activities received half of the
money (Ogura and Yoshino, 1988, table 3).
Table 1. Human Capital and per Capita Income in Selected
Asian and Latin American Countries, Mid-1950s
Human Per capita Ratio of human capital
Country Year capital indexa incomeb index to per capita income
Japan 1955 1673 519 3.2
Korea 1955 494 217 2.3
Philippines 1956 738 277 2.7
Malaysia 1957 334 351 1.0
Argentina 1955 760 1059 0.7
Mexico 1955 352 637 0.6
a. Human capital index is educational expenditure embodied in the labor force. Values for Japan and Mexico
are interpolated from observations for 1950 and 1960; value for Argentina interpolated from observations from
1947 and 1960.
b. Per capita income is the purchasing-power-adjusted figure in international dollars from the Penn World Tables.260 Marcus Noland and Howard Pack
One source of indirect subsidies is the public financial institutions,
which offer loans at rates below the prevailing market interest rate. A
second source of implicit capital subsidy is the accelerated depreciation
allowed under the tax system.12 Although some countries allow instan-
taneous depreciation of new investment (the only method that does not
distort profitability of new investment), most require depreciation to be
taken over the life of the asset. Insofar as legal asset life and the struc-
ture of assets differ among sectors, there may be implicit differentia-
tion among them in the present discounted value of depreciation allow-
ances. In addition, an export-based special depreciation system existed
in Japan from 1961–1972.
 An indication of the quantitative significance of the implicit capi-
tal subsidies is given in table 2, which reports the ratio of the implicit
Figure 1. Sectoral Composition of On-budget Subsidies
Source: Ogura and Yoshino (1988, table 1).
12. This discussion follows that of Ogura and Yoshino (1988). Special depreca-
tion schemes existed in Japan throughout the postwar period. The most impor-








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.262 Marcus Noland and Howard Pack
capital subsidy to investment for fourteen industries in 1968, 1976,
and 1984.13 The low interest rate loans have generally been of greater
quantitative significance than the special depreciation provisions. With
the exception of mining, where investment has been weak and the in-
volvement of public financial institutions high, the implicit capital-
subsidy-to-investment ratio has been low, generally less than 5 per-
cent. After mining, the greatest beneficiary of the reduced interest bur-
dens has been the transportation machinery industry, which includes
shipbuilding, motor vehicles, and aircraft.14
Certain tax and budget policy provisions beyond the relatively uni-
form low subsidy ratios reported in table 2 have been used to promote
high technology sectors. Special depreciation provisions are provided for
the purchase of numerically controlled machine tools, computers and
terminals, computer aided design equipment, and industrial robots. Ad-
ditional tax incentives exist for the use of these products by small busi-
nesses, though the amounts appear to be relatively small. Other special
tax provisions exist for the software industry.15 The Japanese computer
and robotics industries have been further assisted by the Japan Develop-
ment Bank and Small Business Finance Corporation funding, including
the establishment of special leasing corporations to encourage the leas-
ing of Japanese computers and robots, especially by small firms.16
13. The implicit subsidy provided through the provision of these low interest
loans has been calculated as the difference between interest rates charged by
private and public sector financial institutions multiplied by the amount of govern-
ment financial institution loans. In the case of the tax provisions, the special tax
depreciation can be thought of as an interest-free loan; thus the subsidy value of
the special depreciation provisions is the implicit interest burden reduction associ-
ated with the loan.
14. Japanese policymakers also have access to off-budget funds for industrial
promotion through revenues of quasipublic organizations such as the Motor Boat
Racing Association and the Japan Bicycle Rehabilitation Association (Prestowitz,
1988). The amounts of these funds do not appear to be particularly large, however.
Saxonhouse (1983) cites The Wall Street Journal to the effect that no more than
$500,000 a year from these sources was made available to the Japan Machine Tool
Builders Association.
15. The tax benefits are not contingent on the origin of the purchased soft-
ware or equipment, so the impact of these provisions has been to expand the
Japanese market for these products, not assist Japanese manufacturers per se.
Likewise, special provisions that allow computer manufacturers to deduct ex-
pected losses on the return of equipment offered to users on a trial basis do not
discriminate by origin and thus in principle could be used by domestic manufactur-
ers, local subsidiaries of foreign manufactures, or importers.
16. Unlike the tax provisions, which are justified on the grounds of promoting
the diffusion of new technologies and do not discriminate between domestic and
foreign products, the leasing schemes specifically apply to Japanese-made equip-
ment. The amounts of money involved appear relatively small, however.263 Industrial Policies and Growth
The government has also promoted high technology sectors through
direct subsidies to R&D activity, special deductions for R&D costs, and
reduced interest burdens through the provision of low interest loans by
public financial institutions. Tax preferences were provided through a
variety of schemes. The most important channel of direct subsidies to
R&D activity in quantitative terms has been the system of research
contracts on large-scale industrial technology R&D established in 1966.
Of particular significance were subsidies to promote the development
of computers in the 1970s, and research contracts on next-generation
industrial technology, including new materials, biotechnology, and new
electronic devices, in the 1980s.
Lastly, private R&D has been subsidized through the provision of
low interest loans by public financial institutions for financing develop-
ment of new technology. Private R&D activities are provided indirect
support by a number of government-supported institutions. These in-
clude national and public research institutes, private nonprofit research
organizations, special public corporations, and the mining and manu-
facturing technology research associations, such as the Very Large Scale
Integration Research Association.
The direct subsidies are the most important component quantitatively
of government R&D support, about twice as large as the tax provisions in
most years. Implicit subsidies through the provision of low interest loans
have been relatively unimportant; government support for research orga-
nizations is approximately as large as direct subsidies. Assessing the sectoral
pattern of R&D is difficult. Direct subsidies from the government, public
corporations such as Nippon Telephone and Telegraph (NTT), and special
R&D tax deductions are only reported at the aggregate level. Sector-spe-
cific indirect support through research associations is difficult to ascer-
tain, partly because individual associations frequently encompass more
than one sector and partly because the budgets of these organizations
include private, as well as government, funding.
Data on the government subsidy share of total R&D expenditures
are reported in table 3. Government support of R&D activities is low,
with total government support, allowing for nonsubsidy financing, ac-
counting for less than 5 percent of private R&D expenditures for the
economy as a whole. This is far less than the comparable figure for the
United States. Within individual sectors, government R&D as a share
of total R&D has been highest in the declining mining industry, fol-
lowed by the energy-related sector of petroleum and coal products and,
as in the case of capital subsidies, the transportation equipment indus-
try, which includes aerospace.264 Marcus Noland and Howard Pack
With respect to external relations, some researchers emphasize the
government’s role as a doorman, “determining under what conditions
capital technology and manufactured products enter and leave Japan”
(Borrus, D’Andrea Tyson, and Zysman, 1986, p. 98). Table 4 shows the
effective rates of protection (ERPs), computed from tariff data and the
Japanese input-output table.17 In 1968, ERPs were above 10 percent in
all manufacturing sectors except publishing, where the ERP was nega-
tive. The highest ERPs—in excess of 40 percent—were in food process-
ing, textile products, and transportation machinery. The estimates for
food processing and textile products are probably upwardly biased indi-
cators of the true ERPs, however, since in these cases major inputs
were subject to quota protection not included in the ERP calculation.
By 1975, ERPs had fallen for most manufacturing categories. The re-
ductions in ERPs were most dramatic in the machinery sector, where
the ERPs for transportation and precision machinery fell by approxi-
mately 40 and 20 percentage points, respectively. The final column in
table 4 presents estimates of ERPs for 1987, based on tariff cuts agreed
under the Tokyo Round negotiations. Except in the aberrant cases of
17. The ERPs for the primary product sectors are misleading because they do
not take into account quotas in agriculture and subsidies in agriculture and mining.
Table 3. Japan: Government Subsidy Share of Total R&D
Percent
Industry 1968 1976 1984
Mining 3.2 3.2 14.0
Food processing 0.0 0.1 0.4
Textiles 0.7 0.2 1.1
Pulp and paper 0.8 0.3 0.0
Chemicals 0.5 0.3 0.8
Petroleum and coal products 1.0 0.3 7.2
Nonmetallic products 1.0 0.8 1.8
Iron and steel 0.2 0.6 1.7
Nonferrous metal 0.8 1.5 2.9
Metal products 0.1 0.2 0.2
General machinery 1.4 2.2 1.2
Electrical machinery 1.7 1.5 1.4
Transportation machinery 1.0 4.4 4.7
Precision instruments 1.8 0.3 0.1
Source: “Kagaku Gijutsu Kenkyu Chosa Hokoku (Report on the Survey of Research and Development),”
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Table 4. Japan: Effective Rates of Protection
Percent
Industry 1968 1975 1987a
Traded Goods 24.9 19.3 15.8
Primary 5.9 5.5 4.5
Agriculture 7.6 9.4 7.6
Forest –1.0 –0.1 –0.1
Fishery 13.9 8.2 6.7
Mining –0.6 –0.7 –0.5
Manufacturing 26.7 20.6 16.9
Food processing 45.4 55.6 54.1
Textile spinning 21.0 10.8 12.5
Textile weaving 33.6 92.6 94.2
Textile products 41.0 35.4 35.1
Wooden products 18.7 8.9 6.6
Pulp and paper 21.9 21.9 13.5
Publishing –3.4 –3.3 –2.3
Leather and rubber 26.0 23.5 22.0
Chemicals 18.9 15.7 12.3
Petroleum and coal products 10.9 6.7 7.0
Nonmetallic mineral products 17.7 8.8 6.4
Iron and steel 28.9 20.8 14.9
Nonferrous metals 31.0 32.2 20.1
Metal products 18.7 8.6 6.3
General machinery 17.9 8.2 6.2
Electrical machinery 21.0 13.4 6.5
Transport machinery 45.4 5.4 1.4
Precision machinery 27.3 8.7 7.2
Miscellaneous products 28.0 20.4 9.9
Source: Shouda (1982).
a. Figures for 1987 are estimates.
food processing and textiles, the ERPs are under 10 percent for most
manufacturing categories, indicating a general fall in rates of protec-
tion over a twenty-year period. Again, these calculations are based on
tariff protection only; they do not take nontariff barriers into account,
and the sectors are relatively aggregated. Nonetheless, barring a dra-
matic increase in nontraditional protection, most manufacturing sec-
tors appear to have undergone a gradual liberalization.
The Japanese government also bargained with foreign technology
suppliers, acting as a monopsonist. Goto and Wakasugi (1988) give the
example of royalty payments on the importation of a particular Austrian266 Marcus Noland and Howard Pack
steel production technology, which were held down to 1 cent per ton for
Japan through an agreement between the Ministry of International Trade
and Industry (MITI) and the industry, whereas U.S. firms paid up to 35
cents per ton for the licensing of the same technology (p. 190). For the
microelectronics industry, Borrus, D’Andrea Tyson, and Zysman (1986)
describe how the Japanese government used its monopsonistic power to
extract very low prices for technology transfers from U.S. firms in the
1960s and 1970s. Nevertheless, the saving thus achieved was miniscule
compared to either export revenues or GDP.
Government procurement is another channel through which the
government of Japan sought to tilt the playing field. Bergsten and Noland
(1994), for example, calculate that if in 1990 Japanese public purchases
of supercomputers produced by Japanese and U.S. firms (the only non-
Japanese producers) had followed the pattern exhibited in the Euro-
pean Union (the only third market), then U.S. producers would have
increased their sales by $30 million annually, supporting nearly $5
million in additional R&D.18 The authors obtain similar, and quantita-
tively larger, results for public procurement of nonsupercomputers. In
another public procurement case, the 1980s dispute over the FSX fighter
agreement could be interpreted as an attempt by the U.S. government
to use its market power to counterbalance the Japanese government’s
monopsony position vis-à-vis General Dynamics. All of these cases—steel,
numerically controlled machine tools, microelectronics, and possibly
aircraft—display a common pattern of selective protection, strict regu-
lation of inward foreign direct investment and technology transfer, and
preferential tax treatment and access to capital until the industry
achieved international competitiveness. Rosovsky calls this pattern “the
denial of the profits of innovation.”19
2.1 Assessment
A number of researchers attempt to model the impact of Japanese
industrial policies on output, trade, and welfare in a cross-industry
framework.20 Lee (1993) examines the impact of Japanese industrial
policies using a computable general equilibrium model. Unfortunately,
the high degree of aggregation (only three traded goods sectors) and the
18. The same calculation found that the U.S. government discriminated recip-
rocally against Japanese supercomputer producers in its procurement decisions.
19. H. Rosovsky, “Trade, Japan and the Year 2000,” New York Times, 6 Sept 1985.
20. See Baldwin and Krugman (1988) and Flamm (1996) for models of single
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calibration assumption (industrial policies in the 1950s had no impact)
render his results suspect.
Noland (1993a) evaluates the impact of these policies on the Japanese
economy. The results obtained indicate that trade protection, as measured
by the ERPs in table 4, was generally associated with worse-than-expected
performance in net exports, apparently contradicting the notion that Japa-
nese policymakers successfully promoted infant industries.21 Indirect sub-
sidies, however, were associated with the expansion of output and better-
than-expected trade performance. In fact, the estimated effects were so
large as to give credence to the argument that Japanese industrial policy
acted as a signaling device to private investors, either because the govern-
ment was better able to process information than private agents or be-
cause government participation in a sector or project created a moral haz-
ard or one-way bet. While the industrial policies were effective in the sense
that market interventions appear to have had an impact on sectoral re-
source flows, on the whole they did not appear to be welfare enhancing,
when the Itoh-Kiyono model, which runs off of terms-of-trade effects, was
used to evaluate policy impact. Indeed, from this perspective welfare-en-
hancing interventions appear to have been the exception, not the rule.
Considerable evidence supports the unsurprising notion that dur-
ing the postwar period, Japan’s comparative advantage shifted into R&D-
intensive activities (Balassa and Noland, 1989; Vestal, 1989; Grossman,
1990). Evidence on the impact of public policies is more scarce. Noland
(1996) disaggregates R&D into basic, developmental, and applied ac-
tivities and separates public and private sources of funding. At the end
of the sample period 1969–1989, Japan had a comparative advantage in
goods intensive in total, privately funded, and applied R&D activities,
and a comparative disadvantage in publicly funded and basic R&D-
intensive goods. However, the change in coefficient values over the course
of the sample period suggests that publicly financed R&D had a large
positive impact on sectoral trade competitiveness through the late-1970s
and early 1980s. This result could be interpreted as being consistent
with the notion that the relative impact of public support can be rela-
tively high at early stages of development before the private sector R&D
capacity is significantly developed and during the period of technologi-
cal catch-up when R&D priorities can be relatively well defined on the
21. Noland (1997) obtain more ambiguous results for a more detailed menu of
Japanese trade policies. Audretsch and Yamawaki (1988) investigate the impact
of Japanese industrial policies by including a dummy variable for favored indus-
tries in a regression on U.S.-Japan bilateral trade. The coefficient was significant
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basis of existing technologies.22 Sakakibara (1997) casts doubt on even
this modest formulation, however, arguing that participation in publicly
supported R&D consortia was concentrated in slow-growth sectors and
that sharing fixed costs was not an important factor in determining
participation.
Beason and Weinstein (1996) directly confront the issue of indus-
trial policies and sectoral TFP growth. Working with a sample of thir-
teen sectors for the period 1955–1990, they fail to uncover evidence
that taxes, subsidies, or industrial policies (as measured by the ERPs
reported in table 4) targeted sectors with increasing returns to scale or
that industrial policies contributed to TFP growth. They do find some
evidence that industrial policies targeted sectors with high labor usage
prior to the first oil shock. Lawrence and Weinstein (2001) extend this
work on a slightly different dataset and find that differential corporate
tax rates had an impact on sectoral TFP growth, while direct subsidies
and subsidized loans did not. Moreover, they find that the ERP mea-
sure is negatively associated with sectoral TFP growth and that im-
ports, not exports, are positively associated with TFP growth.
Imports can contribute to increasing productivity through at least
two channels. The first is by providing domestic producers with new,
improved, or highly specialized intermediate inputs to which they would
not otherwise have access. The second is by competing with domestic
products and thereby acting as a constant spur to domestic producers to
cut costs and improve quality. Lawrence and Weinstein divide imports
into competitive and noncompetitive imports, and in the case of Japan,
they find evidence to support the second hypothesis. They conclude that
Japan’s growth would have been even faster if it had cut tariffs and
exposed a greater share of its domestic producers to foreign competition.
It is more difficult to assess the impact of the informal policies, if
for no other reason than that they are less amenable to formal model-
ing. For this reason, it would be desirable to develop better descriptions
of the workings of the industry councils (shingikai) and the process of
setting targets, as well as better accounts of the penalties and rewards
used to encourage adherence to informal guidance. The one study that
attempts to model the impact of administrative guidance (Weinstein,
1995) finds that administrative encouragement of cartels had only a
minor impact on prices, margins, and sectoral resource allocation dur-
22. Kim and Oh (1999) analyze annual data on research and development
expenditures for 1971–1997 and find that public R&D expenditures Granger-cause
private R&D in Japan during this period. Unfortunately, their limited sample size
precludes the testing of this result for subperiods.269 Industrial Policies and Growth
ing the period 1957–1988. Sakakibara and Porter (2001), who examine
the impact of the tolerance of cartels on domestic competition and in-
ternational trade performance, find that cartels are negatively associ-
ated with domestic competition, which, in turn, is positively associated
with international competitiveness. They interpret their results as
undercutting what they perceive as the conventional wisdom that in-
dustrial policies promoted Japanese competitiveness.
This discussion has focused on issues relating to cross-sectoral
resource allocation. Some argue that Japanese policy has had a
proproducer bias and that this may have contributed to Japan’s growth
performance by increasing incentives to save and thus providing Japa-
nese firms with a ready supply of low cost capital.23 As shown in
figure 2, Japan (as well as Korea and Taiwan) did, in fact, accumu-
late capital more rapidly than the major Latin American economies.
This argument is seldom formalized, however, and while it has some
surface plausibility, it is hard to square with the life-cycle hypoth-
esis. Furthermore, research on Japanese saving behavior has not
uncovered links between industrial policies and national saving.24 Yano
Figure 2. Capital Stock per Capita
23. A largely closed capital account up through the mid-1980s facilitated the
maintenance of a pool of captive saving, though this is not absolutely necessary if
there is home-bias in portfolio allocations.
24. See Balassa and Noland (1988, chap. 4); Horioka and Watanabe (1997).270 Marcus Noland and Howard Pack
(2001), however, demonstrates that in a dynamic two-country model,
lax competition policies with respect to the nontraded sector of a large
trade-surplus economy can act as a beggar-thy-neighbor policy, shift-
ing real income to itself from its trade-deficit partner.
2.2 Politics and Implementation
Industrial policies intrinsically support some sectors to the detriment
of others. It seems plausible that this would be manifested in conflict among
sectors and among their bureaucratic counterparts. Within ministries,
the bureaucratic hierarchy can ensure plan consistency, with conflicts
resolved through conventional means. Ensuring consistency among plans
of different ministries in Japan has proved far more problematic.
Indeed, conflicts between competing ministries are a recurrent fea-
ture of Japanese politics. For example, the Ministry of Economy, Trade,
and Industry (METI, formerly the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry, or MITI)—which represents the interests of the electronics
firms—is in perpetual conflict with the Ministry of Public Manage-
ment, Home Affairs, Posts, and Telecommunications (formerly the
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, or MPT)—which represents
the interests of NTT.25 Inevitably, what is at issue is the desire of the
electronics firms for telecommunications reform that would encourage
the growth of electronic data transmission and other activities expected
to increase demand for electronic equipment such as computers. These
disputes have often resulted in protracted periods of uncertainty and
policy paralysis. One could interpret the results reported above, that
policy interventions were not welfare enhancing, as evidence of a lack
of overall policy coherence.
The degree of ministerial coordination in formulating industrial policy
points to the use of rewards and punishments to encourage compliance.
An important question is whether the government can coordinate its in-
centives across ministries. Could, for example, bureaucrats threaten re-
calcitrant firms with retribution through actions, such as tax harass-
ment or exclusion from government procurement, that are the purview of
another ministry? Put differently, is the game firm versus ministry or
firm versus government? There is little evidence of cross-ministry coordi-
nation, and although most of the political science literature extolling the
25. In 2001, Japan undertook a number of telecommunications reforms. Nev-
ertheless, the principal theme of METI’s 2001 White Paper, which was released
after the telecom reforms were enacted, was the need for further reform of the
telecom sector—the purview of another ministry.271 Industrial Policies and Growth
impact of industrial policy implicitly assumes benevolent bureaucrats,
Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1997) argue that Japanese industrial policies
can best be understood as a product of self-interested political actors.
2.3 Conclusions
There is considerable evidence that industrial policies have influ-
enced the sectoral composition of output and trade in Japan. Rather
than being the forward-looking drivers that proponents of industrial
policies envision, however, the evidence suggests that industrial poli-
cies were aimed overwhelmingly at internationally noncompetitive natu-
ral-resource-based sectors, at least in terms of measurable interven-
tions. Indeed, once general equilibrium considerations are taken into
account, the manufacturing sector as a whole probably experienced
negative net resource transfers. This supposition is borne out by table
5, which reports sectoral tax rates normalized for the overall corporate
tax level. The normalized tax rates for the manufacturing sector are
almost uniformly negative—that is, the sector was paying higher-than-
average taxes. Within manufacturing, the strategy might then be re-
garded as a compensatory policy toward some favored activities or firms.
The diverse empirical estimates reviewed here thus indicate that there
is no firm evidence that industrial policies were welfare- or growth-en-
hancing in the period after the postwar reconstruction period. This could
be due to the inability of policymakers to identify market failures and
design appropriate interventions. However the evidence that most resource
flows went to large, politically influential, “backward” sectors suggests
that political economy considerations may be central to this outcome.
3. INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN KOREA
Korea’s experience with industrial policies has generated signifi-
cantly less attention than the Japanese case. Korea is a smaller
economy, Korea poses less of a competitive threat to U.S. industry
and hence has attracted less attention from U.S.-based scholars, and
limitations in the Korean data on the relevant policy instruments
severely constrain researchers’ ability to do the kind of applied work
carried out on Japan.
Like Japan, Korea went through an extended period of relative isola-
tion from the rest of the world, which came to an end in the late nine-
teenth century. Korea was occupied by Japan in 1905, and formally an-







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.273 Industrial Policies and Growth
and the peninsula was divided into U.S. and Soviet zones of military
control. The partition of the peninsula was formalized in 1948.
Considerable industrialization and technological learning occurred
during the Japanese colonial period, though most of the industry was
located in the northern part of the peninsula, while the southern part
of the peninsula served as the breadbasket.26 Japanese economic insti-
tutions and practices were transferred to the peninsula. As in the case
of Japan, operation of the economy during the period of U.S. military
occupation was characterized by a high degree of state control and use
of quantitative allocations.
During the Korean War (1950–1953), the armies of both sides tra-
versed the peninsula several times, destroying much of the capital stock.
Mass population movements presumably resulted in a net flow of hu-
man capital from the North to the South. As in the case of Japan’s
emergence from the Second World War, in the aftermath of the Korean
War, South Korea’s endowment of human capital was high relative to
its contemporaneous income level (see table 1).27 South Korea contin-
ued to accumulate human capital rapidly after the war (figure 3). Its
students were relatively concentrated in science and engineering, though
not remarkably so. In fact, the Asian and Latin American countries
look strikingly similar in this regard (table 6).
The maintenance of negative real interest rates until the 1960s
inhibited the development of the banking sector, which was permitted
little freedom from government control, and encouraged the channeling
Table 6. Science and Engineering Students
Share of science and engineering
Country Year Total students in tertiary education
Japan 1955 589,903 0.152
Korea 1956 80,935 0.206
Philippines 1957 224,988 0.145
Malaysia 1967 8,455 0.142
Argentina 1955 142,522 0.161
Mexico 1961 94,073 0.255
Chile 1957 18,185 0.214
Source: UNESCO.
26. See Noland (2000a) for additional details and references to the relevant
literature.
27. Rodrik (1995) makes the same point.274 Marcus Noland and Howard Pack
of capital to large, politically influential borrowers. As the prominent
South Korean economist Cho Soon observes, “the most notable feature of
the [South] Korean economy during the 1950s was its dependence on
U.S. economic aid” (Cho, 1994, p.13).28
The orientation of Korean policy changed significantly in the mid-
1960s following a military coup that brought General Park Chung-hee
to power. Export performance was seized as a barometer of success.
As one observer put it, “they were the only statistics that couldn’t be
faked.” Multiple exchange rates were unified and the currency deval-
ued in 1964. Export targets were formulated in considerable detail by
product, market, and exporting firm. Firms not achieving their tar-
gets were not subject to penalty; however, the targets were sometimes
Figure 3. Mean Total Years of Education
28. This assistance was not entirely without merit, however. South Koreans
were able to expand their skill base through cooperation with the United States.
American aid directly contributed to the rapid expansion of education within South
Korea and made overseas training and education possible for thousands of Kore-
ans (Westphal, Rhee, and Purcell, 1981), including some of its future economic
policymakers. Some transfer of technical skills and management techniques un-
doubtedly occurred through close contact with U.S. military forces, but its signifi-
cance is difficult to assess. Likewise, local firms certainly benefited from participa-
tion in local military procurement programs and later from offshore procurement
programs during the Vietnam War (Rhee, 1994).275 Industrial Policies and Growth
negotiated jointly with wastage allowances, and firms achieving their
targeted goals could expect more favorable tax treatment (Westphal
and Kim, 1982).
At the same time, the government introduced a wide range of ex-
port promotion measures. A government-subsidized organization, the
Korea Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTRA), was established to pro-
mote exports and perform market research. Exporters were provided
exemptions from duties on imported intermediates, tax incentives, pref-
erential access to capital, special depreciation allowances on imported
capital equipment, and a variety of nonpecuniary awards. Exporters
also received generous wastage allowances on duty-free imports and
reduced prices for electricity and rail transport.29 The export-import
link allowed exporters to earn rents through the importation of restricted
items. Overall, the trade regime can be characterized as modestly pro-
export biased, with established industries receiving roughly neutral
effective incentives, while a few infant industries were actively pro-
moted (Westphal and Kim, 1982).30
Economic policy changed in the 1970s in response to a variety of
internal and external political developments. Korea initiated the heavy
and chemical industry (HCI) drive to steer the composition of indus-
trial output toward capital- and technology-intensive sectors and engi-
neering-intensive products, in an attempt to reduce reliance on low
real wage levels, upgrade the country’s export profile, and reduce reli-
ance on imported arms. Industrial policies efforts were intensified, and
in a break from the relatively rules-based policies of the 1960s, greater
policy discretion and selectivity was introduced.
The financial liberalization policy was reversed in 1972, when in-
terest rates were lowered and direct government control of the banking
system was increased in order to channel capital to preferred sectors,
29. The excess wastage allowances on duty-free imports for export production
allowed export-oriented firms to divert these duty-free inputs into the production of
goods for local sale, to their competitive advantage in the domestic market.
30. While the trade regime was being recast toward greater export orienta-
tion, reforms were also implemented in other areas of economic policy. In 1963,
the military government revised the labor laws to discourage the establishment of
independent labor unions, instead encouraging the organization of unions within
a centralized system to facilitate government control. This system was tightened
further in 1971 by the introduction of legislation banning strikes, which made
virtually any form of collective bargaining or action illegal (Haggard, 1990; Cho,
1994). Financial reform began in 1965, when interest rates were raised to encour-
age saving and financial deepening, as well as more efficient use of capital. The
national saving rate doubled in five years, and the ratio of M2 (a broad definition
of the money supply) to GNP nearly tripled over the same period.276 Marcus Noland and Howard Pack
projects, and firms. Special public financial institutions were estab-
lished to finance large-scale projects, and commercial banks were in-
structed to make loans to strategic projects on a preferential basis. By
the late 1970s, the share of these so-called policy loans had risen to 60
percent (Yoo, 1994). These loans carried negative real interest rates, on
average, and the annual interest subsidy grew from about 3 percent of
gross national product (GNP) in 1962–1971 to approximately 10 per-
cent of GNP, on average, between 1972 and 1979 (Pyo, 1989). Capital
channeling policies were augmented by extensive tax incentives for the
priority industries. The special tax measures are estimated to have
reduced the marginal corporate tax rate from 50 percent to 20 percent
for the targeted industries, which also received trade protection. This
era came to a close in late 1979 as a result of the combined effect of the
second oil shock and the assassination of Park that same year. Subse-
quent Korean governments have attempted to scale back industrial
policies, with varying degrees of enthusiasm and success.
3.1 Assessment
For industrial policies to be successful, the market equilibrium must
be suboptimal. Governments must be able to identify these opportuni-
ties for welfare-enhancing interventions, formulate and implement the
appropriate policies, and prevent political market failures from leading
the policies astray. Industrial policies in Korea clearly affected the cross-
sector allocation of resources. Yoo (1994) estimates that the HCI credit,
tax, and trade policies resulted in around 80 percent of fixed invest-
ment in the manufacturing sector going to the favored heavy and chemi-
cal industries in the late 1970s. During the first three years of the
Fourth Five Year Plan (1977–1981), investment in basic metals and
chemicals was 130 percent and 121 percent, respectively, of the targets
for the entire period, while textiles and other light industries received
only 50 percent and 42 percent, respectively, of their planned invest-
ment (Balassa, 1990). Whether this resource channeling was welfare
enhancing or growth promoting is less clear.
Kim (1990) surveys the fiscal, credit, tax, and trade policies under-
taken during this period and concludes that the strategy was unsuc-
cessful: it had the predictable result of generating excess capacity in
favored sectors while starving nonfavored sectors for resources, as well
as contributing to inflation and the accumulation of foreign debt. More-
over, “the government [was] reckless in its selection of launch enter-
prises and in its almost haphazard provision of generous incentives…277 Industrial Policies and Growth
[Its] direct, unlimited role in industrial promotion placed it in the posi-
tion of an implicit, de facto risk partner, thus complicating the efforts
at market-determined adjustment” (p. 44).
Yoo (1990) covers similar terrain, distinguishing between the less
selective efforts at export promotion in the 1960s and the more aggres-
sive industrial promotion efforts of the 1970s. He directly confronts the
argument that the HCI policy was a success inasmuch as the favored
industries became major exporters in the 1980s. He addresses this ar-
gument by posing two counterfactuals: what would the Korean economy
have looked like in the absence of the policy, and how would the Korean
trade structure have looked in its absence? Using reasoning similar to
Kim’s, Yoo concludes that the Korea economy would have been better
off in macroeconomic terms without the HCI policy. But what about
industrial upgrading? Yoo compares the Korean experience with other,
similarly endowed economies (in particular Taiwan) and finds that the
HCI policy was not successful in terms of either upgrading or trade
performance. Given the high rates of return on capital, the opportunity
costs of prematurely promoting a sector may have been enormous.
Park and Kwon (1995) conclude that the establishment of oligopolistic
positions by the chaebol during the HCI drive retarded technological
change. They argue that once scale economies were taken into account,
TFP, correctly measured, actually turned negative, though the disen-
tangling of scale economies from TFP is not straightforward.31 Simi-
larly, Kwon and Paik (1995) use a computable general equilibrium model
calibrated to 1978 to investigate the potential magnitude of these direc-
tions. They find that resource misallocation reduced GDP by less than
one percent if capital is assumed to be immobile and by more than
three percent if it is mobile. The calculated welfare impact is higher.
Very few papers directly address the linkage between industrial
policies and sectoral productivity growth. Lee (1997), who examines
a panel of thirty-eight Korean industries over the period 1963–1983,
finds that trade protection in the form of tariff or nontariff barriers
is negatively associated with the growth rate of labor and total fac-
tor productivity. Tax incentives and subsidized credit are
31. See Kwack (2000, tables 7 and 8) for a summary of twenty-three studies
of Korean TFP growth. In Kwack’s own estimation, he finds, like Kwon and Park,
that Korean TFP growth declined over time and, in the case of light industry,
actually turned negative. It is hard to understand how resource misallocation
driven by favoritism toward heavy industry could result in light industry TFP
turning negative. These TFP estimates are unlikely to be very robust, depending
on both theoretical specifications and delicate estimates of capital stocks during a
time of both rapid capital accumulation and technological obsolescence.278 Marcus Noland and Howard Pack
uncorrelated with sectoral productivity growth. Yoo (1993) analyzes
the determinants of the cross-sectional pattern of trade protection.
The results are not robust, but they suggest that political economy
rather than efficiency considerations determined the pattern of pro-
tection. Finally, Pack (2000) finds that TFP growth in the heavy
and chemical industry sectors was not sufficiently large to have ex-
erted a major impact on aggregate growth.
These results cast doubt on the efficacy of resource channeling.
Other studies, however, make a case for Korea’s choice of strategies.
Pack and Westphal (1986) and Okuno-Fujiwara (1988) focus on in-
terindustry linkages and the potentially welfare-enhancing coordi-
nation role for the government. Pack and Westphal suggest that
Korea’s policy of selective intervention might have been successful
in fostering infant industries without significant losses in efficiency
in the early stages of development (the mid-1960s to early 1970s).
The key was to capture latent interindustry pecuniary and nonpe-
cuniary externalities. “The Korean government can be seen as hav-
ing achieved integrated decisionmaking by acting as a central agent
mediating among market agents, forcing and facilitating informa-
tion interchange,… ensuring the implementation of decisions
reached,… weighing costs and benefits from a collective standpoint,
and often intervening to reward cooperative players and punish un-
cooperative ones” (1986, p.99)
In both this model and that of Okuno-Fujiwara (1988), the same
outcome could presumably be attained through organizational integra-
tion. Pack and Westphal argue, however, that this was not feasible in
the case of Korea: “The externalities may flow in complex and insepa-
rable patterns among (actual and potential) agents covering most if not
all of the industrial sector” (1986, p.99), necessitating government in-
tervention.32 Investment coordination may have helped to overcome
these patterns in the early stages of industrialization, but by the 1970s
the growth of the chaebol undoubtedly reduced the importance of gov-
ernment coordination. While none of these giant firms produced the
entire range of industrial products, the owners of the firms knew each
other and private coordination undoubtedly occurred. While govern-
ment intervention might have reduced some interpersonal transaction
32. Auty (1991) provides detailed descriptions of indivisibilities and other en-
try barriers in the HCI industries. Even after assessing possible pecuniary and
nonpecuniary externalities, however, he concludes that from an economy-wide
perspective, resources were misallocated.279 Industrial Policies and Growth
costs, many of the potential externalities were presumably dealt with
by Coasian agreements among the firms.33
The key to successfully implementing welfare-enhancing industrial
policies through government coordination activities to capture interin-
dustry externalities lies in the existence of interindustry externalities,
which when captured, expand the production set of the economy. It is
difficult to model this rigorously. The likely scope for growth-enhanc-
ing interventions would be increased, however, if the industries tar-
geted for intervention met three criteria. First, they should have strong
interindustry linkages to the rest of the economy. Second, they should
be leading in a causal sense, so that growth stimulus would be trans-
mitted forward through the economy. An input-supplier industry in
the Okuno-Fujiwara model is an example. Finally, variations in out-
put should have a strong industry-specific component; otherwise, varia-
tions in output might simply be due to common macroeconomic shocks
and there is little scope for industry-specific stimulus. The existence of
industry-specific variation in output suggests the possibility for indus-
try-specific technical change, as well as scope for industry-specific policy
interventions to increase output. Noland (1993b) examines data on
twenty-six Korean manufacturing industries over the period 1960–1989.
He identifies four sectors that possibly met these criteria—wood prod-
ucts, paper, petroleum and coal products, and nonferrous metals—and
a fifth—nonmetallic products—that arguably did. These are not the
typical sectors associated with industrial policies, nor, with the exception
of nonferrous metals, were any of them promoted during the HCI drive.
Pack (2000) provides another test of potential interindustry exter-
nalities. Industrial policies could have generated benefits in other sec-
tors as a consequence of three developments: domestic production of
intermediate goods with special characteristics that were not available
internationally but that improved productivity in the local purchasing
firm; movement of workers and managers from firms in promoted sec-
tors to firms in other sectors, in which the movers brought with them
uncodified knowledge; and direct interactions on equipment design by
producers and local buyers of machinery that led to adaptations to
machinery that were particularly suitable for local firms. All three
externalities could potentially increase TFP growth in the neglected
33. If anything, this argument seems more applicable to the Japanese case,
since vertical integration is less complete in Japan. The keiretsu, networks of
affiliated firms, strike a balance between the coordination advantage of full inte-
gration and the maintenance of competition among suppliers. In this more loosely
organized system, the government’s coordinating role could be larger.280 Marcus Noland and Howard Pack
sectors, in addition to any benefits accruing to the directly promoted
sectors. The potential quantitative importance of specialized nontraded
intermediate inputs and uncodified knowledge transmitted by work-
ers depends on how much the neglected sectors interact with the pro-
moted ones. One way to gauge the potential benefits is to measure the
purchases of inputs from a favored sector per won of gross output in
the neglected sector. The larger the purchase, the more likely it is
that the neglected sector may derive some benefits from the existence
of local producers. The neglected sector may also derive greater ben-
efits if there are few imports, which constitute an alternative source
of specialized inputs.
We assume that the first and second externalities depend on the
magnitude of interaction with the promoted sectors. Such interactions
can be measured by Leontief input-output coefficients. The n x n input-
output coefficient table, A, consists of two sets of flows, the domestic
intersectoral flows, AD, and the import flow matrix, AM, A = AD + AM.
The coefficient aij is a typical coefficient of the domestic flow table,
while mij denotes elements of the import matrix. The extent of inter-
action between favored and neglected sectors is given by the domestic
input-output coefficient, afn, which measures the purchases of an in-
put from a favored sector per dollar of gross output of the neglected
sector. The larger is afn, the more likely the neglected sector may
derive some benefits from the existence of local producers. 34 The
neglected sector may derive greater benefits if there are mij few im-
ports that constitute an alternative source of specialized inputs. Thus,
the lower is mij relative to aij, the larger the potential impact of the
availability of local production.
Several measures of the magnitude of interaction between the pro-
moted and neglected sectors in Korea are presented in table 7. The
average input-output interaction between favored and neglected sec-
tors is quite small. The favored sectors account for a very small por-
tion of the domestically purchased inputs of most neglected sectors.
Second, the heavy industries purchase extensively from one another.
Third, the imports of the neglected sectors in Korea are, on average,
twice the size of the combined purchases from the favored domestic
sectors (.134 versus .068).
34. It is possible to test whether indirect interactions mediated through other
sectors have an effect by using the inverse coefficients of the Leontief matrix.
However, the sources of real external economies enumerated above are not eas-
ily extended to indirect interactions.281 Industrial Policies and Growth
These patterns suggest several probable effects on nonpromoted
sectors. First, it is unlikely that the promoted sectors were quantita-
tively critical in increasing the range of available inputs. Although
industrial policies may have encouraged the domestic production of some
unique nontraded inputs, the overall impact was small relative to all
domestic and foreign purchases. Unless there was very low substitut-
ability between local and foreign inputs, the quantitative effect of local
supply of such inputs was limited. Rosenberg (1976) cites the impor-
tance of local interactions in situations in which both user and pro-
ducer are themselves at the world frontier and there are no suppliers
in other countries. In contrast, Korean firms in the periods considered
Table 7. Korea: Intersectoral Purchases, 1985
Source of purchased materials
All domestic Heavy Chemical Foreign
Purchasing sector sectors industries industry suppliers
Neglected sectors
Food 0.147 0.007 0.021 0.029
Beverages 0.290 0.025 0.012 0.019
Tobacco 0.048 0.002 0.006 0.009
Textiles and clothing 0.522 0.007 0.125 0.099
Leather 0.319 0.003 0.055 0.355
Wood and wood products 0.240 0.026 0.043 0.060
Paper 0.422 0.019 0.044 0.183
Printing and publishing 0.408 0.017 0.042 0.039
Petroleum and coal 0.053 0.003 0.003 0.009
Rubber products 0.373 0.025 0.121 0.124
Nonmetallic minerals 0.293 0.029 0.020 0.029
Misc. manufacturing 0.402 0.096 0.087 0.123
Neglected sector average 0.293 0.021 0.047 0.134
Favored sectors
Chemicals 0.357 0.010 0.249 0.209
Heavy industries
Iron and steel 0.542 0.466 0.009 0.131
Metal products 0.412 0.335 0.031 0.143
Nonelectric machinery 0.387 0.334 0.016 0.163
Electric machinery 0.324 0.245 0.034 0.272
Transport equipment 0.388 0.332 0.015 0.173
Heavy industry average 0.411 0.342 0.021 0.176
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on input-output tables contained in Bank of Korea, Monthly Statistical
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were not at the world frontier in the neglected sectors and had many
opportunities for obtaining specialized inputs from abroad. The imports
into all sectors demonstrate that this opportunity was used.
Second, insofar as movement of workers and managers might pro-
vide important knowledge transfer, the small purchases from the pro-
moted sectors imply that such knowledge transmission would have been
limited. Any tacit knowledge brought by worker mobility, about the
special properties of purchased inputs or how to use them more effec-
tively, would affect only a small component of total costs. While one
can posit, as in the case of specialized inputs, that there is a critical
piece of knowledge whose possession has exceptionally high marginal
productivity for the recipient sector, the quantitative case does not seem
plausible. Moreover, such knowledge could have been obtained from
technology licensing agreements and consultants from abroad.
Third, promoted sectors are substantial purchasers of one another’s
inputs, at least in the metal-based sectors. The necessary condition for
investment coordination benefits thus existed in 1985. By that year,
however, these sectors were already large exporters and importers of
products within the sector (see column 4). The possibility of invest-
ment coordination cannot be dismissed, but the extent of international
trade suggests it was unlikely to be decisive.
Finally, some interactions are not captured by the input-output trans-
actions shown. In particular, the interactions between the producers and
final purchasers of machines are not given, since investment is a final
demand. An analysis of the ratio of imports to domestic production of ma-
chinery is telling. In Korea in 1985, imports of nonelectrical machinery
were three times that of domestic production (3.04), compared with 0.06 in
Japan in 1980. The ratios with respect to electrical machinery were 0.27
for Korea and 0.04 for Japan. It is difficult to argue that there were no
imported substitutes or that special adaptations to local conditions were
quantitatively significant. Even if locally produced equipment conferred
some cost reductions on its users that would not have been garnered from
internationally available equipment, it would have affected only one-quar-
ter of annual general machinery investment as late as 1985.
3.2 Politics and Implementation
The impact of industrial policies on growth is less clear in the case
of Korea than in the case of Japan. If anything, the Korean case under-
lines the problematic nature of the actual implementation of industrial
policies. There have been two interrelated problems. First, the involve-283 Industrial Policies and Growth
ment of the state in both the implementation and financing of indus-
trial policies gave rise to enormous problems of moral hazard and the
socialization of risk. The chaebol could use capital from favored projects
to cross-subsidize other ventures, confident that the government would
not allow them to fail. The result was investment without regard to
rates of return and weak corporate balance sheets. Given the lack of
workable bankruptcy or exit policies to discipline failures, management
strategy amounted to unlimited expansion, or what Yoo (1999) calls
“survival of the fattest.” Statistics on chaebols do not exist for the 1960s
(because of lack of balance sheet data), but SaKong (1993) documents
that the share of the top ten chaebol in South Korean GDP rose from 5
percent to 23 percent in the decade between 1973 and 1982.
 According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD), “shareholder value was systematically destroyed
from the late 1980s onward” (OECD, 1998, p. 23). The events of recent
years are a testimony to this weakness: the $73 billion bankruptcy of
Daewoo, the country’s second-largest chaebol, was the largest corpo-
rate failure in world history, and Hyundai, the country’s largest chaebol,
is currently facing exceptional stress under market pressure.
Second, the availability of subsidized resources and the central-
ity of government relations to corporate success gave rise to an orgy
of rent-seeking and corruption that continues to bedevil Korean busi-
ness-government relations.35 In Transparency International’s Cor-
ruption Perceptions Index 1999, South Korea ranked fiftieth out of
ninety-nine, tied with Jamaica and Lithuania.36  This lack of trans-
parency imposes a penalty on financial transactions in the South
Korean market, increasing investor hurdle rates and inhibiting the
ability of good firms to access capital. The transparency risk pre-
mium, separate from and in addition to conventional country and
currency risk, inhibits investment in the South Korean economy.37
3.3 Conclusions
As a former colony of Japan, Korea inherited certain Japan institu-
tions and tendencies in the economics sphere. Like Japan, it suffered
significant devastation through war, and its level of human capital and
35. For an entertaining account of business-government relations through
the early 1990s, see Clifford (1997). For more recent material, see Noland (2000a);
Woo-Cumings (2001).
36. Available at www.transparency.org.
37. For more detail, see Noland, “Economic Reform in Korea: Achievements
and Future Prospects” (www.iie.com/papers/noland0201-3.htm [2001]).284 Marcus Noland and Howard Pack
social capacity in the 1950s was high relative to contemporaneous in-
come. The Korean government pursued industrial policies even more
intensely than Japan.
Most of the evidence on resource channeling suggests that the strat-
egy did not have a major impact on growth after the initiation in 1973
of the program to encourage the engineering and chemical sectors. If
anything, the impact appears to be negative. Evidence abounds, how-
ever, on the detrimental impact that industrial policies has had on
business-government relations and corporate governance after the ini-
tiation of the HCI effort. As state intervention into the economy grew
in the 1970s, political connections became increasingly important rela-
tive to business acumen in determining success. Korea still lacks vi-
able exit mechanisms for failing firms, and business-government rela-
tions remain seeped in nontransparency and corruption.
4. INDUSTRIAL POLICIES IN TAIWAN
Taiwan, like Korea, is a former Japanese colony, and like Japan
and Korea, it also had an Olsonian upheaval, in this case associated
with the conclusion of the Chinese revolution and the decampment of
the Nationalist government and thousands of its supporters to Taiwan
at the end of 1948.
Taiwan’s experience with industrial policy has generated consid-
erable analysis. The standard neoclassical interpretation (Little, 1979)
is that Taiwan’s development was primarily attributable to a low level
of trade protection, the availability of inputs to exporters at interna-
tional prices, a conservative macroeconomic policy manifested in lim-
ited inflation, and competitive factor markets. The last points are
suggested by positive real rates of interest and the absence of duality
in the wage structure, either by size of firm or by sector. Wade (1990)
contends that a critical component of Taiwan’s success was its indus-
trial policy, which helped to establish new and successful manufac-
turing sectors.38 This and similar studies document the extensive
employment of tariffs, quantitative restrictions, and selective credit
policies, arguing that Taiwan’s success in the period considered was
attributable to an intensive effort by the government to direct the
sectoral evolution of the economy. This was implemented by a variety
of means: the establishment of public enterprises when private initia-
38. See, for example, Clark (1989), Gold (1986), and the papers in Winckler
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tive was not forthcoming or the capital markets were reluctant or un-
able to fund very large projects; extensive employment of tariffs and
quantitative restrictions on imports; and direction of credit to preferred
industrial sectors through the highly controlled financial sector. The
view that Taiwan approximated the laissez-faire environment of Hong
Kong is untenable in light of the carefully accumulated facts. Moreover,
the data on which earlier interpretations are based—namely, the fairly
low (but by no means single digit) effective protection rates—were esti-
mated in the late 1960s. As in the case of Japan and Korea, Taiwan’s
industrial policy may have helped to jump-start the economy from its
low 1950 levels, and much of the evidence on the role of the govern-
ment focuses on the 1960s and early 1970s. The benefits from indus-
trial policy in the succeeding years are not easily shown, however,
although efforts in this vein undoubtedly continued.
The basic fiscal incentive program was the Statute for the Encour-
agement of Investment (SEI), which was in place from 1961 to 1990.
Available to both foreign and domestic firms, it targeted specific indus-
tries, though the focus shifted over time from exporting (1960s) to capi-
tal-intensive sectors (1970s) to technology-intensive sectors (1980s).
Under this program participating firms could choose either tax exemp-
tions or accelerated depreciation on capital equipment, with most firms
taking the former option.
In 1987 the government commissioned a study to examine the
program. The report concluded that while the program might have
contributed to economic development at the outset, by the 1980s it had
outlived its usefulness. Specifically, the report cited four problems: (1)
the program was contributing to highly uneven tax burdens across
firms; (2) the complexity of the law was creating insurmountable diffi-
culties in administration; (3) the creation of groups with a vested inter-
est in the continuation of the status quo was inhibiting the adoption of
more rational policies; and (4) the correlation between participating
firms and productivity or profitability was low.
In response, the government discontinued the SEI in 1990, re-
placing it with the more functionally oriented Statute for the Upgrad-
ing of Industry (SUI). Under SUI firms are eligible for tax relief based
on their expenditure on socially favored activities such as R&D or
pollution-control, although some industry-specific incentives in the
high-technology sector were retained. Interestingly, Taiwan’s presi-
dent at the time, Lee Teng-hui, was a U.S.-educated Ph.D. economist
who had coauthored the first study of effective incentives in Taiwan
(Lee and Liang, 1982).286 Marcus Noland and Howard Pack
A second industrial policies tool was directed credit. Like Japan
and Korea, Taiwan maintained a relatively repressed financial system
and channeled credit, though not to the extent the Koreans did. Smith
(2000) shows that public utilities were the largest recipient of loans to
promote strategic industries, followed by chemicals. The most important
subsidized credit program was export finance to support preshipment
expenses and the importation of raw materials. As shown in figure 4, the
differential in the interest rate between export loans and nonexport loans
was significant in the 1960s and 1970s. The volume of these loans were
rather small, however: at least since 1971 (the first year for which data
are available), the subsidy component was less than one-quarter of one
percent of the value of exports. High technology industries were not major
recipients of either strategic or export loans.
The third major tool of industrial policies was trade controls. Tai-
wan pursued import substitution industrialization (ISI) policies in the
1950s, and its trade regime in the 1960s and 1970s was characterized by
relatively high nominal tariffs, especially in agriculture; ubiquitous
Figure 4. Taiwan: Export Loan Subsidy
Source:  Smith (1997, table 4; 2000, table 2.7).287 Industrial Policies and Growth
nontariff barriers, again especially in agriculture; restrictions on inward
foreign investment; and the promotion of state-owned firms. Beginning
in the 1960s, however, policies were adopted to limit the inefficiencies
associated with trade protection. With respect to domestic sales, produc-
ers seeking protection had to justify protection on the basis of their abil-
ity to compete against imports, and they were subject to time-phased
price controls that forced them to reduce prices in the local market to
within five percent of comparable imports by 1973 (Lee and Liang, 1982).
With respect to foreign sales, the impact of trade protection was partly
offset by various tax rebate schemes, duty drawbacks (as in the case of
Korea), and the creation of export processing zones and bonded manufac-
turing warehouses. The latter institutions eventually accounted for a
significant share of Taiwanese exports. As a consequence of these poli-
cies, actual tariff collections were well below statutory rates (figure 5).
Beginning in 1989, the government undertook a far-reaching trade lib-
eralization that brought the level of trade protection down to developed
country levels, at least in the manufacturing sector.
Figure 5. Taiwan: Average Tariff Burden
Source: Smith (1997, table 2; 2000, table2.2).288 Marcus Noland and Howard Pack
Smith (2000) combines the tax, subsidy, and trade components to
calculate effective rates of assistance. Her tables make interesting read-
ing. In 1989, for example, assistance was so great in miscellaneous
food products, nonalcoholic beverages, wool and worsted fabrics, cer-
tain chemical products, cement products, industrial fertilizers, other
artificial fibers, medicines, and motor vehicles that these sectors were
producing negative value-added at world prices. As Smith observes, a
number of these sectors were characterized by the presence of state-
owned firms. Whatever the extent of industrial policy interventions in
the 1950s and 1960s, the government became convinced by the 1970s
and especially the 1980s that its industrial policy interventions were
having only a modest impact at considerable cost, and authorities ac-
tively attempted to scale back incentives. This attempt to rationalize
industrial policy efforts ran into political constraints, however. Smith’s
estimates of the effective rate of assistance actually exhibit greater cross-
sectoral dispersion at the end of the 1980s than at the beginning of the
decade, as politically influential sectors were able to preserve their per-
quisites in the context of overall shrinking support to industry.
Beyond these standard industrial policy tools, the Taiwanese gov-
ernment introduced another set of policies conducive to the develop-
ment of the manufacturing sector, namely, the establishment of a large
number of institutions that were designed to identify, transfer, diffuse,
and efficiently absorb foreign industrial technologies and then to un-
dertake innovation. These latter policies were largely implemented in
the late 1970s and 1980s, though precursors existed in the 1960s. Ex-
amples include the Hsinchu Science Park and the Industrial Technol-
ogy Research Institute (ITRI).39 These efforts reflect the fact that un-
like Korea and Japan, Taiwan’s policies were more neutral with re-
spect to firm size. Much of its industrial development was based on
firms with fewer than a hundred employees. Centralized research (as
conducted at ITRI) could be justified on standard grounds that social
rates of return to R&D exceed private returns, while the science park
served as a means of generating economies of scope in the use of critical
services such as accounting and consulting, which were provided by
the park. The science park also sought to demonstrate to expatriate
Taiwanese, largely in the United States, that Taiwan was committed
to a serious effort in high technology. Whether this was as important
as the high salaries in luring engineers back to Taiwan is unknown.
39. The most thorough analysis of these institutions is contained in Dahlman
and Sananikone (1997).289 Industrial Policies and Growth
The government fostered the creation of venture capital funds to pro-
vide capital for these start-ups. Intellectual property rights (IPR) protec-
tion, which had been notoriously lax in Taiwan, was tightened in the
1990s in response to both internal factors (the growth of domestic IPR-
producing activities) and external pressures for better IPR enforcement,
which were generated bilaterally from the United States, regionally through
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and multilaterally through
Taiwan’s negotiations to enter the World Trade Organization (WTO).
A variety of studies examine the effectiveness of these policies in
stimulating rapid growth. Smith (2000) presents work that generally
fails to find links between the industrial policy interventions and
sectoral TFP growth or trade performance. Rather, the pattern of
industrial policy intervention appears to be driven more by political
economy considerations, such as sectoral employment, the presence
of large firms, or the degree of sectoral concentration, than by dy-
namic comparative advantage.
Pack and Lin (2001) follow a different strategy, in which they as-
sume the presence of nonmeasured forms of stimulation such as the
subsidy equivalent of the establishment of industrial parks, central-
ized research institutes, and centralized productivity centers. These
may be large and have a limited correlation with the ERP or the effec-
tive rate of subsidy (ERS). They then assume that any exceptional
growth in the favored industrial sectors was due entirely to industrial
policy and that the TFP growth rate in such sectors was doubled. These
assumptions are very favorable to finding a positive role industrial policy,
and Pack and Lin find that industrial policy could have added 2 percent-
age points of TFP growth in manufacturing. Given that manufacturing
accounted for about 30 percent of GDP, this would have increased aggre-
gate TFP by roughly 0.6 percent per year out of a total GDP growth rate
of 10 percent per year in the period 1962–1989. That figure is certainly
not trivial, but it hardly represents the entire story of Taiwan’s develop-
ment. The high rate of TFP growth in all sectors, even neglected ones,
the high rate of saving and investment over and above the high levels
induced by industrial policy, and the acquisition of skills through educa-
tion all played a significant role. Industrial policy may have played a
more significant role if one accepts the most optimistic assumptions.
Even if one accepts the most optimistic assumptions, which raise the
estimated role of industrial policies considerably, the strategy still ac-
counts for a relatively small proportion of Taiwan’s success.
The preceding assumes that the impact of selective industrial poli-
cies benefited only the promoted sectors and that the high rate of290 Marcus Noland and Howard Pack
productivity growth in the neglected sectors was not affected by
spillovers. If, however, the rate of TFP growth in neglected sectors
was increased indirectly by the growth of the favored sectors, the
calculated increment to TFP may underestimate the impact of indus-
trial policy. Indeed, proponents of industrial policies often argue that
some of their major effects are manifested indirectly in other sectors,
and they dismiss as inconsequential evidence about the limited im-
pact in the targeted sectors. When Pack and Lin (2001) employ an
input-output approach similar to that described above for Korea to
obtain some measure of the potential indirect impact of the promoted
sectors, they find similarly small evidence of potential gains accruing
to the neglected sectors.
5. LATIN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
In the 1950s, while Korea and Taiwan were quite poor and often
exhibited incoherent economic policies, many Latin American econo-
mies embarked on systematic import substitution industrialization
(ISI) programs reflecting the regnant view of Raul Prebisch and the
United Nation’s Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC). In some cases, ISI was initiated well before ECLAC
was established, partly out of disillusion with world trade prospects
during the depression of the 1930s and the disruptions of World War
II. Insofar as this policy, by definition, discriminated among indus-
trial sectors, it constituted a systematic attempt to pursue industrial
policy. As is well known, the attempt failed, at considerable economic
cost. This section briefly considers why Latin America experienced
failure, while in Asia the policies appear not to have damaged the
economies during their high growth period and may even have had
slight benefits, as indicated above.
The answer to the question has two strands: initial conditions and
the mechanism for monitoring the progress of industries benefiting from
government encouragement. As has been emphasized in numerous
studies, Korea and Taiwan exhibited higher literacy rates and argu-
ably better infrastructure, such as roads and ports, at the beginning
of their high growth episode. Even a brilliantly designed economic
program would have floundered if exports—an important component
of Korea’s and Taiwan’s success—could not have been moved to ports
and if the ports had themselves not been fairly efficient. On the other
hand, too much can be made of such differences and of the purported
benefits of the long Japanese occupation that was responsible for the291 Industrial Policies and Growth
existing education and infrastructure, if only for their own benefit.
Neither country had the university education levels or the health care
system of Argentina or Chile (table 1), and both of the latter had
sufficiently good transportation and ports to have engaged in signifi-
cant primary product exports.
Some authors argue that Latin America had the luxury of attempt-
ing sustained ISI because it could fall back on natural resource ex-
ports. Moreover, its endowments militated in favor of natural-resource-
based exports and against labor-intensive exports. Scatter plots of data
on labor, physical capital, human capital, and arable land endowments
for a number of countries in 1968 are shown in figure 6. Each of the
four panels in the figure shows a barycentric projection of three endow-
ments. Every endowment point on a ray emanating from one corner of
the triangle has the same ratio of the other two factors; points lying
closer to the corner of the triangle have a larger relative endowment of
that factor. The point at which the three rays emanating from each
vertex intersect in the middle of the triangle indicates the average en-
dowment bundle of the sample.
In panel A, for example, Taiwan (TAI), Korea (KOR), Hong Kong
(HK), and Singapore (SNG) are arrayed across the bottom of the tri-
angle, far from the land endowment vertex, in order of increasing ra-
tios of physical capital to labor. A similar pattern is found in each of the
scatter plots, with the land-scarce countries of East Asia clustered across
the bottom in panel A (indicating land scarceness), near the human
capital vertex in panel B, and so on. In contrast, the Latin American
countries tend to reveal relatively large endowments of land and low
endowments of physical capital, with Argentina (ARG) being a clear
outlier in panel A. In panel B, the large Latin American countries clus-
ter near the arable land vertex, together with similarly endowed coun-
tries such as Tunisia (TUN), Turkey (TUR), Spain (SPA), Thailand
(THA), and to a certain extent Pakistan (PAK). Finally, Chile (CHI)
differs somewhat from Argentina, Brazil (BRA), and Mexico (MEX) as a
result of its lower abundance of arable land.
These multifactor starting points are important. As Leamer (1987)
shows, there is some econometric evidence that land-scarce countries
(such as those of East Asia) tend to specialize in manufactures earlier
(that is, at lower levels of per capita income) and more intensively (that
is, with higher output-per-worker ratios) than economies with more diver-
sified resource bases. Moreover, economies along the bottom of figure 6A
will almost surely experience rising wages as physical capital is accu-
mulated and capital-to-labor ratios rise, generating growth with equity.Figure 6. Endowment Triangle:
A. Labor, Physical Capital, Land (1968 data)
B. Labor, Human Capital, Land (1968 data)Figure 6. (continued)
C. Land, Physical Capital, Human Capital (1968 data)
D. Labor, Physical Capital, Human Capital (1968 data)294 Marcus Noland and Howard Pack
In economies with larger natural resource bases, the rents generated by
resource extraction will retard specialization in manufacturing, thereby
increasing the likelihood that capital accumulation might not be accom-
panied by rising wages (growth without development).
A full evaluation of this perspective would require examining the en-
tire trade bundle, but some insights can be obtained from an analysis of
the composition of manufacturing. The results obtained by the Inter-Ameri-
can Development Bank (IDB) in an investigation of this issue do not quite
conform to simple expectations, although other tests of the hypothesis can
certainly be constructed. Table 8 shows the revealed comparative advan-
tage (RCA) in manufacturing in 1988–1990 for Latin America , the OECD
countries, and industrializing Asia. Latin America’s RCA in all manufac-
turing was slightly less, 1.62, than industrializing Asia’s. Industrializing
Asia also exhibited a greater RCA in unskilled labor than Latin America
(3.38 versus 2.51), as well as a greater RCA in natural-resource-intensive
products (1.91 versus 1.15). Industrializing Asia was thus able to import,
process, and export resource-based manufactured products. The latter is a
surprising result given the costs of importing raw materials. It implies
that even in resource-based sectors, the efficiency of Latin American manu-
facturing was low. This implies that ISI probably had the effect of discour-
aging those sectors in which Latin America had a comparative advantage
because of transportation costs, with the reverse holding true in Asia.
This is simply another instance of the perverse effects of Latin America’s
efforts at selective promotion via ISI.
An interesting parallel to the Latin American experience is that
of the Philippines. The country began the postwar period with many
advantages, including high education (see tables 1 and 6), a large
number of English speakers (conducive to trade relations), and close
affiliation with the United States. Despite predictions in the 1950s
that it would be the great success story in Asia (Morawetz, 1980), it
performed dismally as a result of import substitution policies similar
to those of Latin America. Most of the standard empirical studies of
the impact of ISI, which is another version of industrial policy, bracket
the Philippines with Latin American countries (see, for example,
Little, Scitovsky, and Scott, 1970). Having a latitude and longitude
that placed a country in Asia could not guarantee growth. Correct
basic policies matter.40
40. Ironically, as detailed in Noland (2000b), the Philippines undertook con-
siderable reforms in the 1990s, especially in the financial sector, and a variety of
indices show that the country weathered the Asian financial crisis better than the
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Initial conditions are thus inadequate as the sole explanation of
different economic outcomes. Differences in the nature of the indus-
trial policies and their implementation are critical. Many sectors in
Latin America received extensive protection, as evidenced by the
high rates of effective protection calculated for all of the countries
for which such estimates were made. While protection rates were
generally highest for consumer goods and lowest for machinery, they
were nevertheless high for most sectors. Firms in inefficient sectors
could earn significant profits and their employees high wages (paid
out of the rents collected from consumers) while facing little cred-
ible prospect that protection would be contingent on improved effi-
ciency. There was simply no monitoring mechanism; once protec-
tion was granted, the levels were essentially not reduced until crises
occurred in the 1980s and later.
In contrast, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan undertook continuous
monitoring of firms’ progress. The clearest example is provided by
Korea, where subsidized credit and protection in the domestic mar-
ket were contingent on export performance. Exports became the
numéraire by which the progress of individual firms was measured.
Current data on the exports of the individual firms within a given
promoted sector were presented at quarterly meetings at the Blue
House, the seat of the executive branch of government. The infor-
mation was obtained not from the companies themselves, but from
bills of lading at Korean ports. Realized exports were compared with
targets set by the Economic Planning Board for each firm. Because
the export targets were constantly increased, firms were forced to
improve their productivity in order to lower marginal costs, the al-
ternative being lower profits over time. While many firms initially
subsidized their unprofitable exports by cross-subsidies from their
profitable (protected) domestic market, this was clearly not a long-
term solution in that the export targets were increased considerably
faster than the growth of domestic sales. Firms were thus forced to
concentrate on improving productivity, which stimulated enormous
efforts to import and assimilate foreign technology.41 Despite con-
troversies about the precise levels of TFP growth in Korea and Tai-
wan, their rates were clearly far above those prevalent in Latin
America during its import substitution phase (Nelson and Pack,
1999). In contrast, Latin America made no attempt to combine a
41. On Korea, see Westphal, Kim, and Dahlman (1985) and Kim (1999); on
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stick of control with the carrot of protection. We know of no instances
in which a government actually reduced protection to a sector that
did not perform well.
As noted above, it is impossible to confirm substantial benefits from
industrial policies in Asia, but at least no major short-term damage
was done, which is more than can be said for the Latin American expe-
rience with ISI. Korea and Taiwan experienced fairly high TFP growth
rates compared with Latin America, although all calculations indicate
that much of this would have accrued without selective intervention.
The major difference is the use of a numéraire, particularly exports, to
measure success, as opposed to the provision of open-ended protection
for inefficient sectors. Nevertheless, even the benign experience in Ko-
rea and Taiwan during the heady days of intervention and growth may
have had unfortunate long term consequences. Many of Korea’s prob-
lems in recent years may have their origin in the policies pursued. The
suppression of the financial system and the use of directed credit to
individual firms discouraged the accumulation of normal financial evalu-
ation skills and may have affected the quality of financial intermedia-
tion in Korea. Low-cost loans clearly encouraged many firms to expand
beyond their core competence—capable manufacturing firms entered
the resort industry, for instance.
The long-term benefits of industrial policy may have been partly
offset by the unforeseen consequences of the policies themselves. Hav-
ing carefully implemented the earlier policies, Japan, Korea, and Tai-
wan did not suffer serious consequences and may have extracted small
benefits for several decades, though some argue that they could have
done still better given their high saving and investment rates. Latin
American nations, on the other hand, suffered almost immediately from
protection combined with overvalued exchange rates that discouraged
exporting. The Asian countries were thus able to zoom past their ini-
tial Latin American per-capita-income peers (or superiors) such as Ar-
gentina and Chile. To benefit from ISI, however, would have required a
much different economic outlook than was the case, including a focus
on some measure of efficiency and a political system capable of enforc-
ing the requirement for improvements in productivity as the basis for
receiving the rents extracted from consumers and taxpayers.
Perhaps one advantage of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan lay in the
traumatic experiences following World War II. For reasons that dif-
fered in each case, the governments had little legitimacy. Japan had
suffered a traumatic defeat after initiating the Second World War in
the Pacific. Korea had gained independence from its Japanese colonial299 Industrial Policies and Growth
ruler, but it had then been partitioned and subject to a devastating
three-year war that destroyed much of the infrastructure and caused
enormous casualties in 1950–1952. Taiwan was the base of the defeated
Kuomintang government that had hastily left the Chinese mainland in
1949. In each case, the government eventually tried to establish its
legitimacy by emphasizing economic growth in the 1950s in Japan and
early 1960s in Korea and Taiwan. In all three, land reform had over-
come one set of opponents to policies that were conducive to growth
with equity; in turn, this sharing in rapid growth may have led to a
perception that government policies benefited the general population.42
Thus the industrial policies implemented in these countries, which re-
quired a quid pro quo and in which exports were accepted as the
numéraire, may have been easier to follow and may have allowed the
authorities to avoid instituting protection without time limits and with-
out the forced benefits of learning to compete internationally.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The weight of the evidence marshaled in this paper suggests that
industrial policy made a minor contribution, at most, to the growth of
East Asia. A large part of the Asian Miracle was attributable to
nonmiraculous good macroeconomic policy, including limited government
deficits, low inflation rates, and very stable real exchange rates. These
were conducive to high rates of saving and investment, which are impor-
tant components of the growth story. Another aspect, not discussed ear-
lier, was a bias toward exporting that may have generated some benefits
that would not have accrued from domestic sales (Pack, 1997).
Second, the Asian path is more likely than the Latin American
strategy to generate growth with equity as capital is accumulated and
less likely to run into problems with allocating rents derived from natu-
ral resources. The politics of industrial policies are likely to be less
contentious, and their implementation in the manufacturing sector to
be more widely perceived as “leaning with the wind” of comparative
advantage, than in the case of ISI practices. In any event, the strategy
may be irreproducible. The end of the Cold War and the concomitant
willingness of the United States and other major trading powers to
assert their economic interests, together with the existence of a stron-
ger subsidies code and dispute settlement procedures in the WTO, may
foreclose options that existed in the past.
42. Rodrik (1995) makes a similar argument.300 Marcus Noland and Howard Pack
Countries that have experienced slower growth than expected de-
spite relatively good macroeconomic policies may be tempted to pursue
industrial policies, although the large number of experiments with ISI
suggest that this strategy has not been very successful. The Asian
experience, especially in Korea and Taiwan, provide some guidelines to
avoiding some of the potentially harmful consequences if industrial policy
is nevertheless pursued. Even in these successful nations, however,
the benefits appear to have been limited. Countries with less dedicated,
less competent bureaucracies that are more amenable to lobbying pres-
sures should expect even smaller net benefits.
While it is understandable that countries that have got the basics
right are impatient for growth to accelerate, identifying broad sectors
of growth, let alone specific ones, is particularly difficult. Food and
wine exports from Chile, for example, have grown dramatically in the
last fifteen years, yet it is unlikely that government officials consider-
ing promotion measures two decades ago would have included agricul-
ture,—let alone peaches, grapes, apricots, and plums grown in Novem-
ber through March—on the list of potentially profitable export sectors.
While governments can provide the broad infrastructure, such as edu-
cation in agronomy, efficient airports, and adequate telecommunica-
tions, the detailed knowledge of the potential of such sectors is typically
beyond the competence of officials.
The fact that sectorally targeted industrial policies were not the
major source of either manufacturing or aggregate economic growth
in the countries that implemented them does not mean that the
government has no significant role in stimulating economic growth
outside of macroeconomic management. Growth-enhancing measures
that do not differentiate among sectors include large expenditures
on primary and secondary education, the building of large and effi-
cient social infrastructure, a favorable attitude toward international
technology transfer (including both technology licensing and direct
foreign investment), and a substantial investment in public tech-
nology institutions. The credible commitment of government to rapid
development may itself have a positive effect on risk taking in the
private sector and may lead firms to choose products or processes
that promise greater return. Governments seeking a more active
role in accelerating growth should consider these policies rather than
selective industrial policies.301 Industrial Policies and Growth
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